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Abstract
In the aftermath of large company failures in the early 2000s there emerged a new wave of efforts to enhance
risk management (RM) and control in enterprises. The normative management model, which urges
organisations  to  develop  a  comprehensive,  formal  and  systematic  RM,  was  developed,  and  it  has  been
promoted widely to all organisations, including public sector organisations. Using survey data, this article
describes and explains the diffusion and adoption of RM innovation in local government in Finland. Our
survey results support the argument that if comprehensive RM is not obligatory, it is not widely used in
local government. Our analysis reveals that financial constraints explain to some extent the existence of
comprehensive RM in municipalities, while structural factors such as the size of municipalities do not, even
though RM is slightly more advanced in larger rather than smaller local governments. Slow adoption
indicates that comprehensive RM as a managerial innovation lacks immediate benefit when assessed against
the efforts and costs of its introduction and maintenance. This implies that public sector organisations may
be more selective in adopting business models than is generally assumed.
1. Introduction
The adoption of private sector management models dates back to the 1960s and 1970s, when local
councils started to introduce corporate management ideas and techniques to perform various
management functions. Soon after that, New Public Management (NPM) radically renewed the
theories and practices of public sector management throughout the Western world by promoting
marketisation, consumer choice and managerialism (Hood 1995). Even if by the mid-2000s NPM
was said to have come to the end of its road as a model for public sector management reform
(Dunleavy et al., 2006), many of its tenets persist in public management and service systems and
2also appear in local reform agendas (Lodge and Gill, 2011). A core process of the gradual NPM-
inspired development has been the adoption of corporate management and IT-enabled business
models, which will be discussed in this article with special reference to the adoption of
comprehensive risk management models in local government.
There is a plethora of business models that are fairly similar to risk management (RM), such as
accrual accounting (AA), transaction processing systems (TPS), management information systems
(MIS) and total quality management (TQM), performance-based management (PBM), knowledge
management (KM), enterprise resource planning (ERP) and human resource management (HRM)
systems (Jackson and Lapsley 2003; Spano et al. 2009; Troshani et al. 2011; Alves and Matos
2013). Such systems are essentially about the adoption of operational and management systems
that are as a rule designed for private enterprises and later diffused into the public sector, making
them a special case of the intersectoral diffusion of managerial and organisational innovations (cf.
Leoncini and Montresor 2003). For example, the adoption of accrual accounting in Finnish local
government was a radical yet fairly streamlined top-down process, as it was institutionalised by
the Local Government Act of 1995. It can, in any case, be seen as a consistent step towards
business-style management, thus reflecting the tenets of NPM. Most adoptions of business models
are, however, bottom-up processes in highly decentralised administrative systems such as that of
Finland, even though they are embedded in the hybridised system of local governance, in which
NPM solutions co-exist with hierarchies and governance networks (Yliaska 2015; Anttiroiko and
Valkama 2016). Most cases of intersectoral diffusion saw the daylight in the late 1980s in the form
of IT system adoption, starting with vendor-based accounting, payroll and other TPSs, especially
in central  administration and health care and later on a smaller scale,  MIS and ERP systems in
larger cities. In this context, introducing a comprehensive risk management model to Finnish local
government represents a special case of the adoption of business-driven principles and practices
in public sector organisations, representing a managerialist aspect of NPM.
In spite of a certain degree of isomorphism in such adoption schemes, risk management (RM) has
its special features and a particular historical path, which should not be ignored. One critical
juncture that affected risk management in the business sector was the large company failures in
the beginning of the 2000s in the USA and their aftermath, which was also noticed in the public
sector. On the crest of this wave, the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway
Commission (COSO) published in 2004 the Enterprise Risk Management – Integrated Framework
guidance on how to arrange efficient enterprise risk management (ERM), and this has become the
dominant standard in the field (Power 2009; Hayne and Free 2014; Schiller and Prpich 2014).
According to COSO, ERM is applied in strategy setting and across the whole enterprise (COSO
2004 and 2013). COSO also argues that its model is not only for companies but for other
organisations as well (COSO 2004, 13). Later, ISO created a risk management standard (ISO
331000:2009). This defines risk management as involving coordinated activities to direct and
control an organisation with regard to risk. Both COSO and ISO use a formal and comprehensive
model that should be usable by any organisation regardless of its size, activity or sector.
We may assume differences in the relevance of RM between private and public sectors, for the
latter involves politically decided missions, the public interest, special legal requirements, public
finance (especially taxation) and operations confined to a given jurisdiction, which implies
differences in both loss exposures and the selection and implementation of an RM model (cf. Hood
et al. 2001; Drennan and McConnell 2007). Besides this, many of the risks in the public sector are
‘soft’  and  thus  difficult  to  manage  (Cooper  2010).  Thus,  the  claim that  COSO ERM is  sector-
neutral should be assessed against such sectoral differences.
Objective
The  objective  of  this  article  is  to  map  out  the  adoption  of  comprehensive  and  formal  risk
management in local government and assess the reasons behind its diffusion. Our focus is on the
adoption of the abovementioned COSO model. An antithesis to this is the silo approach, which is
traditionally followed in the public sector. This relies on sectoral thinking, which leaves RM to
functional bodies and managers in a diffused manner. This approach may be based on experience
of managing the anticipated task-specific risks in a feasible manner within multi-purpose local
government entities. We do not, thus, take for granted the suitability of any particular RM model,
but rather want to discuss the diffusion of a comprehensive RM model originally developed in a
private sector context.
The popularity of the comprehensive RM model is investigated in Finnish local government on
the basis of survey data. The aim is also to test contingent variables that may explain its diffusion.
We were not only interested in answering the question of the extent of ERM in local government
but also what structural and organisation-specific factors explain the extent of comprehensive RM
adoption.
The special relevance of this discussion lies in the fact that RM is an under-researched area in the
local government context. Existing research, such as Crawford and Stein (2005), Nilsen and Olsen
(2007), Woods (2009), Hood and Smith (2013) and Vinnari and Skaerbaek (2014), is mainly based
on a case study methodology. From an international perspective, research on RM mainly comprises
enterprise case studies and also to some extent surveys using enterprise data. In this study, we fill
this gap by using a survey methodology in analysing RM in the local government sector.
4The Finnish context
Finland is a unitary EU member state (since 1995) with some 5.5 million inhabitants at the
beginning of 2015. Its administrative system consists of a central government and a single tier of
local government (according to the current government plan, new regional governments will be
introduced in 2019). In 2015, there were 336 municipalities and around 200 joint authorities. The
average size of local authorities was 17,000 inhabitants, the largest being the capital city of
Helsinki with over 600,000 inhabitants. It is noteworthy that in spite of successive governments’
persistent promotion of municipal mergers, around half of the municipalities have fewer than 6,000
inhabitants.
In Finland, the Local Government Act was revised on 15.6.2012 (325/2012) with the introduction
of enhanced requirements around internal control and RM. According to the law, municipalities
and joint authorities must from 2014 onwards report their internal control and RM arrangements
and performance in detail in their annual reporting. The law revision was justified particularly by
the increased need for control and risk awareness in local governments that have outsourced and
diversified their service provision in multiple ways and transferred activities to corporations,
associations and joint organisations.
2. Explanatory model
As there are hardly any research results concerning the extent and determinants of municipal ERM,
we partly rely on literature that  discusses the adoption of ERM in the business sector.  We also
utilise innovation adoption and diffusion models applied to local government.
Let us start the model building from structural factors. Organisations of different types and sizes
do not have similar needs relating to comprehensive RM systems. These different needs can be
rationalised using contingency theory, which is one of the main theories used in public
administration research (Michael and Popov 2016). The COSO model states that no two
organisations should apply ERM in the same way (COSO 2004). Research findings support the
presumption that ERM functions better if it is congruent with the organisation’s environment
(Gordon et al. 2009; Woods 2009). This implies that in certain cases congruence with an
organisation’s internal and external circumstances requires less formality and comprehensiveness
and, therefore, provides little incentive to adopt ERM in COSO style.
City size has often been recognised as one of the most important determinants of innovation
adoption in the public sector (e.g. Moon and Norris 2005; Jung and Lee 2016). Size is actually a
standard category in explanatory models and there is no need to question its relevance in RM
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factors of effective ERM differently than large ones (COSO 2004, 23-25). Complex and
decentralised organisational structures increase the need for the coordination and integration of
RM. Size is also a surrogate measure of organisational capability that may influence the ability to
arrange formal ERM (Schiller and Prpich 2014, 1012).
Proposition 1: The larger the local government, the more comprehensive is the risk management.
The more complex and changing the environment, the larger the need for comprehensive ERM,
providing ERM is seen as an efficient tool for organisations to respond systematically to evolving
risks. One indicator of an unstable environment is rapid changes in population, be it rapid growth
or decline. In the Finnish context, municipal depopulation is common in peripheral areas and
strongly connected to an ageing population because of selective migration. However, according to
the Finnish Local Government Act (10.4.2015/410, Paragraph 7) the shrinking municipalities have
the same mandatory services as any other municipality, which makes cost savings difficult. This
and outmigration leads to a diminishing tax base and creates pressure on the municipal economy.
On  the  other  side  of  the  equation,  growing  cities  face  financial  stress  to  provide  services  and
infrastructure to the growing population.
Proposition 2: The less stable the municipal population, the more comprehensive is the risk
management.
The extent of resource dependency is a widely used external factor and highly relevant for our
discussion, too. If a municipality is heavily dependent on central government grants, it must align
itself to a specific external constraint. In Finland, municipalities depend variably on grants.
However, grants to municipalities are mainly automatic and formula-based grants that cannot be
influenced by separate municipalities. The formula criteria are mainly structural, tax base and
service need-related factors.1 The  risk  of  diminishing  grants  cannot  as  a  rule  be  prevented  by
municipalities’ own acts and preventive controls. On the other hand, grant dependency combined
with increased risks of grant cuts in Finland may lead to a need for and existence of RM that
prepares the organisation for the consequences of possible cuts in grant income.
1 The grant formula gives more grants to municipalities with a disadvantageous age structure, dispersed population,
higher than average illness and lower than average tax base per inhabitant. Population change as such is not decisive
in grant allocation; rather, it has an indirect impact through the abovementioned factors (The Law of State Grant to
Basic Services of Local Government, 29.12.2009/1704).
6Proposition 3: The stronger the grant dependency, the more comprehensive is the risk
management.
We can rationalise that those municipalities with a positive financial status have more to lose if
they do not invest in proactive RM. The decision-makers and managers of municipalities have
some latitude to influence their financial performance and position variables. According to COSO
ERM (2004, 3), RM helps management to achieve its performance and profitability targets and
prevent  loss  of  resources.  We  can  thus  assume  that  if  the  municipality  has  ended  up  with
indebtedness, weak solvency and accumulated deficits, this is a sign of neglected RM, which
should foresee possible risks and prepare local governments for those contingencies creating risks.
On the other hand, scarcity is an important factor that limits possibilities to invest resources in RM
development. We discussed this issue with two certified public sector financial auditors with long
experience in Finland (Rönkkö J. and Kiviaho M., personal communication 21.9.2016). Their
common interpretation was, paradoxically, that those municipalities that were in financial
difficulties  had  no  interest  at  all  in  buying  ERM  consulting  on  top  of  everything  else,  and  in
contrast, those municipalities with a good economic status regularly show more interest in ERM.
In short, affluent municipalities have economic resources to invest in formal and comprehensive
RM systems.
Proposition 4: The existence of weak financial performance has a negative impact on the extent of
comprehensive risk management.
Managers and risk officers who initiate board and council decisions regarding RM have a great
impact on both adoption and implementation of RM policies. In our case, special professions such
as Chief Risk Officer (CFO) are of vital importance (Pagach and Warr, 2011; Paape and Spekle,
2012; Liebenberg and Hoyt, 2003; Beasley et al. 2005, 2008; Mikes 2008).
Internal auditing can be assumed to be a contingent factor favouring ERM. Internal auditors can
play a pioneering role in the creation of a higher level of risk and control awareness and a more
formalised and documented risk management system (Zwaan et al. 2009, 588-589). There is also
some case-based evidence of this in Finnish municipalities (Vinnari and Skaerbaek 2014, 517).
The  global  Big  Four  audit  firms  –  Deloitte  &  Touche,  Ernst  &  Young,  KPMG  and
PricewaterhouseCoopers – may promote enterprise RM in an effort to expand their non-audit
consulting services (Power 2007, 2009). The majority of Finnish municipalities are audited by the
previously municipally owned audit firm BDO Audiator. We can assume that BDO Audiator is
7keen on promoting RM and making it auditable in the same way as the Big Four. However, this
Big Four variable was included in our data as a control variable with the assumption that it has no
causal explanatory power.
Proposition 5: The existence of a Chief Risk Officer is in positive correlation with the extent of
comprehensive risk management.
Proposition 6: The existence of an internal audit function (whether the organisation’s own, a joint
internal audit unit or internal auditing contracted from an audit firm) is in positive correlation
with the extent of comprehensive risk management.
Proposition 7: A Big Four audit firm is not a factor that has a different impact on ERM from other
audit firms (mainly BDO Audiator).
In essence, local governments are politico-administrative organisations (Bellò and Spano 2015;
Bouckaert et al. 2010; Christensen 2012). Besides public managers who decisively influence RM,
party politics also  has  a  role  to  play.  We  could  assume  that  socialists  raise  doubts  about  the
suitability of business models and are critical of blue-eyed enthusiasm about promoting private
sector management ideas in the public sector (Mongkol 2011). Accordingly, socialists who are
usually defenders of the traditional Nordic welfare model are more sceptical than non-socialists
about the use of ERM tools.  Such systems can even be seen to support  management control  of
labour processes in a capitalist system (Mihret 2014). Socialist representatives include members
of parties left of the Finnish Centre Party, of which the members of the Social Democratic Party
forms the largest group nationally. This variable indicates the share of socialist councillors elected
to municipal councils for the term 2009-2012.
Proposition 8: The more socialist representatives in the council, the less likely is the municipality
to use comprehensive ERM.
8Figure 1. Explanatory model for the adoption of municipal RM.
In the next section we explain the methods and data used to try out the explanatory model.
3. Research methods and data
The research data consists of a survey accomplished during late 2012 and early 2013. The survey
was targeted at Finnish municipalities (Åland with its 16 municipalities was excluded) and the
majority of joint local authorities established for special health care and vocational education. In
this article we focus solely on municipalities. Respondents were high-level managers: municipal
managers (67), chief administrative (11) and financial (21) managers, chief audit executives (8),
Chief Risk Officers (CROs) (5), and two others (one construction chief and one development
expert). The CROs may not be as neutral respondents as other respondent groups regarding RM,
and this has been taken into account in the analysis.
The response rate was 36% (114 municipalities). The sample of municipalities’ characteristics did
not significantly differ from the aggregate view of all municipalities in Finland. The averages of
the variables used were at the same level as the national averages for Finnish municipalities.
Needs and extent of
comprehensive
municipal entity
risk management
Financial constraint
variables
Structural variables: size
of municipality, stability
of municipal population,
resource dependency
Professional variables:
audit pressure, Chief
Risk Officer
Political variable: non-
socialist vs. socialist
political power
9The RM features were measured using three series of questions. One was related to documentation
and decision-making on RM (3 questions), another to the comprehensiveness of RM (7 questions),
and the third to the implementation and follow-up of RM (6 questions).
We used a linear regression (ordinary least squares, OLS) model, and used as a dependent variable
the average of either Combined Variable 1 (RM coverage) or Combined Variable 2 (RM
implementation), which both reflected the extent of ERM in municipalities. These combined
variables consisted of respondents’ answers measured using Likert scales.
As an addition to the factor choice explanations in Section 2, population change was measured by
the percentage change of inhabitants from 2011 to 2012. This change describes the stability of the
population at the time of data collection. For the regression analysis we transformed negative
percentage figures into positive ones, because we were interested in the level of change, not the
direction of change.2 Grant dependency was measured by the share of grant income from central
government of total incomes in 2012.
We also examined the questionnaire questions with Likert scales with Exploratory Factor Analysis
(EFA) in order to condense the significant dimensions of the questions measuring different
dimensions  of  RM  (cf.  the  use  of  EFA  in  Lundqvist  2014).  The  factor  analysis  confirmed  the
relevance of the two combined summary variables that had been formulated, one measuring the
coverage of RM, and the other the implementation of RM (see Section 4). The rotated factor
analysis results are in the Appendix table. The EFA results showed that the coverage factor and
implementation factor are correlated, but are still two separate factors. This means that a local
government may get low scores on the dimensions of the coverage factor but at the same time may
get higher scores on the implementation factor.
4. Results
4.1. Description of ERM popularity
A  starting  point  in  comprehensive  ERM  is  that  the  principles  and  responsibilities  of  RM  are
decided in the political decision-making bodies and included in official RM documentation. Our
survey data reveals that only just over one third of local governments had a council document
stating  their  RM  principles.  On  the  other  hand,  around  half  of  the  municipal  boards  had  set
instructions on how to implement RM and its procedures.
2 We also tried with population change between 2005 and 2012; the change to this variable instead of that used did
not change our regression analysis results regarding the explanatory power and significant variables.
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Table 1. Risk management documents, instructions and RM work distribution in local
governments
Principal risk
management document
1)
Board instructions
2)
Tasks and responsibilities
defined in an official
decree/ordinance 3)
Municipalities, % of all 35.0 48.6 74.3
n 103 105 105
1) Statement = The municipality or the joint authority has a document accepted in the council that includes the principles of risk
management.
2) Statement = The board has given instructions regarding the implementation of risk management principles and procedures.
3) Statement = Tasks and responsibilities of risk management have been defined in the decree of administration or in other
ordinances.
If a local government has decided specifically upon this division of RM tasks and responsibilities,
these are normally included in the administrative decrees or other municipal ordinances. The
results show that 74% of responding local governments answered that RM tasks and
responsibilities are stipulated in a decree or other ordinance. The majority of local governments
have allocated RM tasks and responsibilities, but at the same time, this allocation is not always
based on higher-level decision-making in councils and boards. A strategy document accepted by
the council is no proof as such of a comprehensive RM practice.
Comprehensiveness of risk management.
In our survey, we asked the respondents to evaluate six statements about the coverage of RM on a
Likert scale of 1-5 (ranging from 1 = totally disagree to 5 = totally agree). The statements were the
following:
Coverage of risk management
1. Risk management covers strategic goals
2. Risk management covers compliance with laws and rules
3. Risk management covers operative risks
4. Risk management covers financing and other essential economy risks
5. Risk management covers different organisational levels (for instance, activity areas and
profit centres)
6. Risk management covers outsourced activities
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We also asked directly whether the respondent’s organisation had used any specific framework or
model in arranging RM. This question (Risk management is based on a systematic framework such
as an ISO standard, COSO ERM, etc.) is number 7 in Table 2.
Table 2. Comprehensiveness of risk management, averages (scale 1-5)
1. Strategic
goals
2. Laws
and rules
3. Operative
goals
4. Finance
& economy
5. Different
levels of
admin.
6. Out-
sourced
services
7. Frame-
work
Municipalities 3.14 3.66 3.69 3.68 3.52 2.94 1.73
N 106 109 108 109 108 105 90
It appeared that RM covers regulatory, financial and operative risks better than it does strategic
and  outsourcing  risks.  If  the  organisation  chooses  a  framework  such  as  COSO ERM, it  should
cover all relevant risks and emphasise the most important ones, strategic risks.
One speculative explanation for the relatively low score in our survey for strategic risks may be
that respondents consider several strategic risks, such as cuts in government grants or economic
recession, as external risks that are non-preventable. If this is true, there may be an inclination to
concentrate on those risks over which the municipality has some degree of direct influence (for
instance, operative risks).
It appears that risk management is seldom systematic in the sense that it is based on a recognised
model such as COSO ERM or ISO 31000. Around half of the respondents were of the opinion that
their RM is not at all based on a systematic framework (those who answered 1 on the Likert scale).
Municipalities had an average score of 1.7 on the 1-5 Likert scale.
Implementation of risk management
We asked respondents’ opinions about the implementation of RM components, again offering a
Likert scale of 1-5 as above. The statements were as follows:
1. Risk management has been informed systematically to responsible managers (for
instance, training)
2. The risk management process includes a systematic evaluation of the environment (for
instance, changes in legislation, financing, etc.)
3. Risk management has been coupled with goal setting and goal attainment
4. The risk management process includes risk identification
5. The risk management process includes assessment of risk probabilities and
consequences
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6. The risk management process includes deciding on risk mitigation
7. The risk management process includes follow-up of risk management implementation
According to the respondents, it appears that RM in municipalities is only moderately transferred
into practical procedures. Internal consistency of RM may be difficult to obtain in multi-purpose
municipalities.
Table 3. Implementation of risk management, averages (scale 1-5)
1. Informing 2. Environment
analysis
3. Coup-
ling with
goals
4. Risk
identification
5. Risk
assessment
6. Risk
mitigation
7. Risk
control
Municipalities 3.04 2.75 2.97 3.39 3.25 3.18 2.97
N 108 108 108 107 108 108 107
To summarise, our investigation shows that local governments are on average following more of
a silo approach than a COSO ERM type model. Arranging RM throughout the whole organisation
systematically and comprehensively is rare although not completely non-existent. Local
governments have obviously invested more resources in RM in selected activities, such as finance,
occupational health and safety, where risks are commonly seen as high from the point of view of
the daily work of public administration.
4.2. Testing the model of RM adoption in municipalities
Our sample of  municipalities represented around one third of all municipalities, and the average
size of our sample municipalities (20,000 inhabitants) differed only slightly from the average size
of all municipalities (17,000 inhabitants). The capital city Helsinki was not included on our sample,
as it is in many respects an exceptional case among Finnish municipalities. After disregarding
Helsinki, there were no structural outliers in the data, as all other municipalities are isomorphic in
their main organisational features.
When we asked respondents directly about the usage of a systematic RM framework such as COSO
ERM or ISO standard, only two respondents from rural municipalities, Virrat (about 7,500
inhabitants) and Rautalammi (about 3,500 inhabitants), scored 5on the Likert scale (strongly used).
If these two outliers are excluded, there seems to be a clear tendency that the bigger the
municipality, the more often RM is guided by a systematic framework. This would give some
relevance to the applicability of contingency theory and the use of structural explanatory factors.
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Next, we created two combined variables, because we wanted to explore the overall adoption of
RM.  One  was  a  combination  of  the  six  questions  regarding  RM  coverage  and  the  other  a
combination of the seven questions regarding RM implementation. The creation of these two
combined variables was supported with the EFA results. Therefore, in Summary Variable 1 (risk
coverage) the maximum score was 6*5 (30 points), in Summary Variable 2 (RM implementation)
it was 7*5 (35 points), and for the two together, 65 points. The cross-tabulation of the two summary
variables showed that the wider the risk coverage, the better the procedural RM implementation
tends to be (Spearman correlation was 0.647). However, these two summary variables measure
two different factors, as the EFA results show. Summary Variables 1 and 2 did not correlate with
the size of the municipality (Appendix Table 1).
There were only five Chief Risk Officers (CROs) in the municipalities surveyed, all in larger cities.
Based on the sample of four of these cities, it seems that they achieve slightly higher scores on
RM implementation (Summary Variable 2) than municipalities on average or municipalities
without CROs. This result, as such, is reasonable, taking into consideration that one of the main
tasks of a professional risk manager is undoubtedly to make RM operative in a systematic way.
The correlations (Table 1 in Appendix) between the predictors and depended variables of risk
coverage and RM implementation were rather weak. For the OLS analysis, we took averages of
the dependent variables (Summary Variables 1 and 2). It is appropriate to treat a quantitative
ordered discrete variable based on a Likert scale (Carifio and Perla 2007) as if it were continuous,
thereby justifying its use as a dependent variable in a regression model (Berry 1993, 47). Models
1 and 2 in Tables 4 and 5 did not show multicollinearity problems (tested with tolerance and VIF
coefficients). Furthermore, the plot of regression standardised residuals showed that there were no
heteroscedasticity problems.
Table 4. Dependent variable, average scores of risk coverage (Summary Variable 1).
Model 1 UnStd Collinearity Model 2 UnStd
Collinearity
Variables
Std. Beta B Sig. Tolerance VIF Std. Beta
B
Sig.
Tolerance VIF
 (Constant)  3.747 .000 4.334 .000
Big Four (dummy) -.108 -.161 .361 .667 1.499
IA function (dummy) -.179 -.250 .205 .473 2.115
CRO (dummy) .018 .053 .885 .566 1.766
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Accumulated
surplus/deficit
.208 9.892E-5 .088 .640 1.564 .154 7.368E-
5
.241 .543 1.843
Liquidity days -.228 -.003 .050 .705 1.418 -.147 -.002 .240 .603 1.658
Loan stock -.245 .000 .014 .997 1.024 -.239 .000 .018 .938 1.066
Municipal personnel -.040 -9.908E-6  .695 .892 1.121 -.022 -5.427E-
6
 .884 .409 2.442
Party variable
Population change
Grant share (%)
-.033
-.125
-.203
-.002
-.107
-.010
.757
.261
.161
.823
.755
.449
1.215
1.325
2.229
Model F-value 2.815 1.885
Model significance .029 .058
Adjusted R2 .068 .082
N 101 100
Model 1 is reduced to size and financial factors while Model 2 consists of all variables, including
the control variables. Big Four and internal audit function had negative coefficients. However,
these two variables were statistically insignificant. The insignificance of Big Four was predicted
but not the insignificance of internal audit function, which indicates that internal auditing has not
been effective in promoting comprehensive RM.
The share of socialist councillors in the council was also a statistically insignificant variable. NPM
reforms in the public sector have been mainly considered as practical necessities without causing
severe political and ideological disputes in Finland. Anyway, our results support a conclusion that
the party variable has no significant effect. Socialist councillors may resist excessive use of
business models in local government, but either they are too weak to stop the introduction of such
models or they may see that ERM as a managerialist intervention is not as ideologically motivated.
In our data, socialists had a majority in two municipalities.
The only explanatory factor that was statistically significant in both models at a 0.05 level was
loan stock. The higher the loan stock, the lower the value of the average of Summary Variable 1
and the comprehensiveness of RM in the municipality. This gives some support to Proposition 4,
according to which weak financial health in municipalities is in negative correlation with the
extent of risk management. However, the exploratory power of Models 1 and 2 was very weak.
The F-value of Model 1 was significant at a 0.05 level, and the F-value of Model 2 was significant
at a 0.10 level.
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The only explanatory factor with 0.05 level significance in the regression analysis for the Summary
Variable 2 average (implementation of RM, Table 5) was accumulated profit/loss (€/inhabitants).
The higher the accumulated profit or smaller the accumulated deficit, the higher the average value
of  RM  implementation  (Summary  Variable  2)  and  the  strength  of  RM  implementation  in
municipalities. This gives support to Proposition 4.
But again, the F-value of Model 2 was not significant at a 0.05 level. The F-value of Model 1 was
significant: Model 1 included only the financial and size variables as independent variables.
Table 5. Dependent variable, average scores of risk management implementation (Summary
Variable 2).
Model 1 UnStd Collinearity Model 2
UnStd Collinearity
Std. Beta B Sig. Toler-
ance
VIF Std. Beta B Sig. Toler-
ance
VIF
(Constant)
3.249 .000 3.568 .000
Big Four
-.101 -.214 .373 ,726 1,377
IA function
-.001 -.003 .992 ,501 1,996
CRO
.115 -.514 .346 ,630 1,588
Accumulated
surplus/deficit .316 .000 .011 .614 1.629 .306 .000 .025 ,518 1,930
Liquidity days
-.284 -.005 .016 .677 1.476 -.208 -.004 .101 ,590 1,695
Loan stock
-.106 -8.861E-005 .276 .972 1.029 -.112 -9.269E-5 .264 ,933 1,071
Municipal personnel
.042 1.506E-005 .679 .887 1.127 -.049 -1.727E-5 .740 ,428 2,334
Party variable
Population change
Grant share (%)
.024
-.111
-.090
.002
-.134
-.006
.817
.320
.533
,858
,754
,447
1,165
1,325
2,239
Model F-value
2.794 1.645
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5. Discussion
The research results as such are representative of the reality of Finnish local government. They are
based on a survey that used personal opinions of respondents as an indicator of RM coverage and
implementation. Considering the positions of the respondents, it is plausible to expect that they
have a comprehensive view of and sufficient competence to assess the condition of RM in their
own organisations.
We conclude that comprehensive and formal RM is not widely used in Finnish local government.
As its adoption is voluntary, it requires there to be a perceived need for such a system in local
governments, which does not seem to be the case. Our survey results indicated that around 26%
of municipalities had extensive risk coverage, while around 18% had implemented RM
procedurally in a wide manner. In brief, a silo approach is more common than a comprehensive
and formal approach to RM in Finnish local government.
There is an indication that the informed usage of a systematic framework like COSO ERM was
more common in larger municipalities than in small ones. However, among the variables tested in
our survey, only financial constraints explained to a degree the adoption of comprehensive RM
models.  It  may be that  local governments that  have a good economic situation can afford ERM
consulting and formal ERM systems that tie up scarce resources. Municipalities that have financial
problems may see ERM formalities as extra costs and burdens that they cannot afford.
In all, the explanatory power of the tested model was overall weak, and over 90% of the variance
of the depended variable remained unexplained. This is an important result that implies that mainly
other than structural or local political factors explain the extent of comprehensive RM. We may
thus assume that there are critical case-specific features of comprehensive RM in the local
government context that affect its adoption.
Table 6. Summary of explanatory power of tested variables
Existence of ERM
Explanatory power
Structural variables Financial constraints Other control variables
None Size, unstable population,
grant dependency
Audit pressure, CRO,
political power
constellation in council
Model significance
.030 .106
Adjusted R2
.066 .060
N
103 102
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Weak Indebtedness, lack of
surplus
Strong
One of the most plausible explanations for the overall rarity of comprehensive RM is that the
preconditions for the comprehensive ERM ideal formulated by COSO may be unrealistic (cf.
Power 2009, 850-851), or at least too cumbersome or laborious relating to the resources available
for risk management in local governments. This would also create a connection with the
explanatory power of financial constraints.
There are similar reasons for the slow adoption of MIS in local government (Heeks 1999).
Municipal decision-makers may be satisfied with a silo approach focusing on activities,
compliance and financial risks that are operational and reasonably manageable (cf. Micheli et al.
2012). This approach may be subjectively interpreted to be enough of a response to environmental
uncertainties and evolving risks. Many of the most severe external risks are beyond the influence
and preventive RM of local governments.
Because structural and organisational features do not explain the slow adoption, with the exception
of financial constraints, and because even ideological division in local politics has equally low
explanatory power, we may seek an answer from role-specific aspects of decision-making and
governance processes. Primarily, local governments in Finland and other Nordic welfare societies
are self-governing multi-purpose entities. In spite of increased managerialism, they are politically
driven organisations in which different actors have different and partly conflicting risk policy and
risk appetite considerations, which may counteract the steady implementation of one
comprehensive RM policy permeating all operative silos and requiring a commensuration process.
Problems of commensurating risks in politically driven multi-purpose public organisations may
effectively hamper attempts to organise comprehensive COSO ERM type systems (Schiller and
Prpich 2014).
Another important factor that has a similar tendency to support a silo mentality is the role of public
managers as agents of change as a decisive factor in determining innovation adoption (Moon and
Norris 2005; Damanpour and Schneider 2009; Carassus et al. 2014). According to COSO, the
internal  environment  is  the  basis  for  ERM,  within  which  the  most  important  factor  is  the
management’s philosophy of managing risks (COSO 2004, 27-28). The attitudes of key managers
and board members towards RM are important qualitative factors in local government. Pressures
to adopt voluntarily comprehensive RM are not successful if senior management is not responsive
to the idea. In addition, some studies emphasise that front-line staff also considerably affect the
implementation of RM, as they become involved only when a concept has real value for their work
(Crawford and Stein 2005). In all, in the Finnish case, the rarity of Chief Risk Officers and the low
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profile of risk management among managerial functions may create conditions which are not
favourable for the wide diffusion of ERM systems.
Our findings indicate that as neither the factors that explain ERM diffusion in business sector nor
the factors that reflect the structural and organisational features of local governments explain the
diffusion of ERM in local government, there is need for a deeper understanding of specific aspects
of RM in local government and the construction of new explanatory models that better match such
model specificity in a local government context. This may also require the use of a case study
approach and qualitative methodology.
6. Conclusion
As the conventional structural and organisational factors included in our model do not provide
sufficient explanation, we may assume that particular case-specific features play a key role in the
diffusion process of RM. It seems that the special nature of risk management together with a silo
mentality hinder the adoption of the comprehensive RM model developed originally in the
business environment. We assume three reasons for the slow adoption.
First, the risk environment and institutional characteristics of public sector entities, including a
persisting silo mentality, do not provide a particularly strong incentive for politicians or public
managers to pursue voluntarily the adoption of a comprehensive RM model. Second, COSO ERM
as a business model is largely insensitive to the needs and realities of public sector organisations
(Baker 2008). This obviously decreases this model’s appeal in local government. Lastly, neither
formal nor intuitive cost-benefit assessment by public managers supports the adoption of COSO
ERM. That is, the expected benefits may look insignificant when compared with the total cost of
the introduction and maintenance of the system.
Our overall conclusion is that public sector organisations, when given a general competence to
decide on local affairs, are more rational and selective in adopting business models than is
generally assumed.
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Appendix Table 1. Combined variable and factor correlations, Pearson Correlation
Combin
ed
Variable
1
Combin
ed
Variabl
e 2
Inhabit
ants
31.12.
2011
Municipal
personnel
Loan
stock
Liquidit
y
Accumu
lated
surplus/
deficit
CRO Big
Four
IA
functi
on
Population
change
Grant
depen
dency
Party
variable
(socialists)
Combined
Variable 2
.631** 1
 Inhabitants
31.12.2011
.000 .106 1
Municipal
personnel
.005 .120 .987* 1
Loan stock -.250* -.112 .031 .027 1
Liquidity -.095 -.093 .066 .041 -.121 1
Accumulated
surplus/deficit
.108 .186 .298* .295** -.143 .520** 1
CRO -.037 .119 .478** .546** .057 -.050 .124 1
Big Four -.207* -.113 .222* .245** .137 .264** .132 .414** 1
IA function -.064 .107 .599* .622** .035 -.028 .150 .365** .236* 1
Population
change
.127 .176 .458** .468** -.008 .003 .236* .216* -.052 .430*
*
1
Grant
dependency
-.154 -.224* -
.564**
-.576 -.080 .044 -.318** -.255** -.080 -
.590*
*
-.665** 1
Party variable .004 .116 .190* .220* -.015 -.002 .081 .202* .106 .324*
*
.194* -
.289*
*
1
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Appendix Table 2. Factor Analysis (EFA)
Pattern Matrixa
Factor
1 2
Risk identification ,962 -,081
Risk assessment ,886 -,046
RM coupled with goals ,850 -,066
Risk mitigation ,763 ,068
Follow-up of RM ,707 ,067
Systematic informing ,695 ,098
Environmental risk analysis ,600 ,176
Operative risks -,135 ,739
Risks of outsourced activities ,012 ,626
Risks of different organisational
levels
,087 ,612
Financial risks ,046 ,539
Compliance risks ,073 ,467
Strategic risks ,241 ,458
Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.
 Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalisation.
a. Rotation converged in 4 iterations.
Risk coverage
RM implementation
